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THE DUTY TO BARGAIN ABOUT
CHANGES IN OPERATIONS
RAYMOND GOETZ*

ANEW LINE of National Labor Relations Board decisions has
extended the obligation of the employer to bargain about
changes in operations, such as subcontracting of work or plant shutdown, which were previously considered to be entirely within management discretion. The Board's theory in these cases, which has
recently been accepted by one court of appeals and rejected by
another, raises some fundamental questions about the extent of the
bargaining obligation and the degree of union participation in
managerial decision making.
The cases referred to involve situations where a change in operations is made by management purely for economic reasons, without
any intent to discriminate against employees because of union membership or to retaliate against the union. In these cases, the legal
question concerns the extent of the employer's duty to bargain with
the union in advance about the decision to make a particular change.
The cases arise under section 8 (a) (5) of the Labor-Management
Relations Act, which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of
his employees."' They also involve section 8 (d) of the act, which
provides that "to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ* 1940-1943, 1947, Beloit College; J.D. 1950, M.B.A. 1963, University of Chicago.
Member, Illinois Bar; partner, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago,
Illinois.
:161 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (5) (1958).
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ment ... , but such obligation does not compel either party to agree
,,2
to a proposal or require the making of a concession ....
I
Town & Country DOCTRMIE
The current philosophy of the NLRB on cases of this type was
first expressed in the Town & Country case,3 which involved a managerial decision to subcontract the employer's entire hauling operations. This resulted in discharge of all employee truck drivers in
the collective bargaining unit, for which a union had been certified
as bargaining agent about one month earlier. The decision was
made and action taken without any prior notice to or discussion
with the union.
The Board's trial examiner found the employer's decision was
motivated by a desire to avoid further violation of Interstate Commerce Commission regulations. Consequently, he found no violation of section 8 (a) (3) of the act, which makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to discriminate "in regard to hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment to encour,,4The
age or discourage membership in any labor organization ....
Board, however, disagreed and found that the drivers had been discharged for discriminatory reasons in violation of section 8 (a) (3).
On this basis, it also found that the termination of hauling operations constituted a refusal to bargain under section 8 (a) (5) because
the employer was motivated by opposition to the union and sought
to disparage and undermine the union as bargaining agent for the
drivers.
The interesting aspect of the decision is that the Board did not
stop with this basis for the section 8 (a) (5) violation. It went on to
agree with the trial examiner that even if the employer's action had
been taken to avoid violation of ICC regulations or because of economic considerations, his unilateral action constituted an unlawful
refusal to bargain in violation of section 8 (a) (5) because he was
under a statutory obligation to bargain as to his decision to subcontract. In overruling an earlier decision in the Fibreboardcase,5 the
THE

.2 61 Stat. 142 (1947);,29 U.S.C..§ 158 (d) (1958).
2
Town & Country Mfg. Co., .136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th

Cir. 1963).
'61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3) (1958).
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961), rev'd on rehearing, 138
N.L.R.B. No. 67 (1962), enforced, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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Board stated that "the elimination of unit jobs, albeit for economic
reasons, is a matter within the statutory phrase 'other terms and conditions of employment' and is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act." 6
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently enforced the
Board's order in the Town & Country case7 in a decision which
upheld the Board's finding of discriminatory motivation of the employer as the basis for a violation of sections 8 (a) (3) and (5). The
court expressed no opinion on the issue under discussion here, the
obligation to bargain on a decision motivated solely by economic
reasons. Thus, the Town & Country case is of interest primarily
because of its dictum pointing the direction of future Board decisions on subcontracting and other changes in operations.
The Fibreboard decision, overruled in the Town & Country
case, involved facts which presented the issue more squarely; namely,
whether an employer, absent any discriminatory motivation, violates
section 8 (a) (5) of the act when he fails to notify and negotiate with
the union about a decision to subcontract work previously done by
bargaining unit employees. That case involved the contracting out
of all plant maintenance work and resultant discharge of all employees in a collective bargaining unit of maintenance workers. In
this case, unlike the Town & Country case, both the trial examiner
and the Board found that the employer's motive was economic rather
than discriminatory. The employer had considered maintenance
costs to be excessive for a long period of time and found that savings
of nearly a quarter of a million dollars could be realized by using
an independent contractor. Four days prior to the expiration of the
existing collective bargaining agreement, the employer arranged a
meeting to .notify the union of the decision to subcontract the maintenance work. The decision was placed into effect on the termination date of the collective bargaining agreement. The employer and
the union had been bargaining collectively since 1937, but the employer refused to discuss the decision to contract out the work.
The Board majority, on the first hearing of the case, found no
unlawful refusal to bargain, but on rehearing after the Town &

0Town

& Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1027 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846

(5th Cir. 1963).
7Town & Country Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).
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Country decision, the previous decision was expressly reversed.8 As
a remedy for the refusal to bargain, the Board ordered reinstitution
of the maintenance operation and reinstatement of the affected
employees with back pay.
The Board's final Fibreboarddecision was recently affirmed by
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 9 The court found
that there was substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion
that the company had refused to bargain and that the Board was
warranted in its determination that the employer violated section
8 (a) (5) "by refusing to bargain before terminating the employment
of all the members of its maintenance force."10 The Board's remedial order was also enforced without qualification. Thus, the Town
& Country doctrine which began as dictum has found its way into
Board holdings supported by at least one court of appeals.
II
IMPLICATIONS OF THE

Town & Country

DOCTRINE

The test emerging from the Town & Country line of cases for
determining whether a particular change in operations falls within
the scope of statutory "terms and conditions of employment," about
which the employer must bargain in advance, is simply whether or
not the employer's decision affects employment. If it does, there is
a duty to bargain about the decision.
Such a test could logically be extended to require bargaining
in numerous situations in addition to the subcontracting situation
in which it was originally formulated. This becomes apparent when
the rationale of the Board's decisions is considered in its most general form:
(1) Any decision to change operations which would affect employment is within the scope of statutory "conditions of employment."
(2) Any unilateral change in "conditions of employment" constitutes
a refusal to bargain.
(3)Therefore, any change in operations which would affect employ'Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. No. 67 (1962), enforced, 322 F.2d 411
(D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3242 (U.S. Jan. 7, 1964).
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLR33., 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
"Old. at 415.
""Shamrock Dairy Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 494 (1959). See also Hillcrest Dairy Co., DNA
1963 DAiLY LAB. RE. No. 146, at D-1 (case No. 8-CA-2928), where the trial examiner
held that the employer must bargain with the union before selling a delivery route

to an employee who would become an independent contractor.
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ment must be bargained about in advance of reaching a decision
to make the change.
Job elimination by contracting out the work of an entire unit,
of course, does have an effect on employment which fits into such a
rationale very well, as the Town & Country and Fibreboard cases
demonstrate. Where jobs themselves are not eliminated, but employees holding them are converted to independent contractors,
similar reasoning has been followed, as illustrated by the Shamrock
Dairy case," which was a forerunner of the Town & Country decision. The trend is indicated by the application of the theory to
subcontracting of miscellaneous maintenance and construction work
which could have been performed by employees on layoff from the
bargaining unit, even though the subcontracting was sporadic and
12
did not result in any permanent elimination of jobs.
The Board's enthusiasm for its new doctrine was carried to an
extreme in the Hawaii Meat case,' 3 where it was held that section
8 (a) (5) prohibited subcontracting of delivery operations during an
economic strike without first bargaining with the striking union,
even though the subcontracting was undertaken merely to keep the
plant in operation. The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the Board

and held that the general right of an employer permanently to replace
economic strikers eliminated the necessity to bargain in this situation.
More recently, the entire theory of the Board on subcontracting
was rejected by the Eighth Circuit in the Adams Dairy case,' 4 in
which the employer had turned over all routes of its driver-salesmen
to independent distributors without discussing the decision with the
union. The court in that case met the issue squarely with the
following statement:
We hold here that the decision on the part of Adams to terminate a

phase of its business and distribute all of its products through independent contractors was not a required subject of collective bargaining.
Shell Oil Co., BNA 1963 DAILY LAB. REP. No. 127, at A-8 (case No. 15-CA-2143).
Hawaii Meat Co. v. NLRB, 821 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1963), denying enforcement of
189 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (1962) (involving permanent subcontracting of delivery operations
during an economic strike, thereby eliminating jobs of drivers and helpers). The Board
had held that the general right of an employer permanently to replace economic
strikers, recognized by the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Mackay Radio
& Tel. Co., 804 U.S. 888 (1988), did not apply in such circumstances, but the Ninth
Circuit found the Mackay case controlling.
14 NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 822 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963), modifying 137 N.L.R.B.
"

815 (1968).
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After that decision has been made, however, § 8 (a) (5) did require negotiation with reference to the treatment of the employees who were terminated by the decision .... 15

Such a clear-cut holding may be somewhat comforting to employers
in that circuit, but it is not likely to deter the Board from further

expanding the scope of the bargaining theory under discussion, in
view of the judicial support of the Board in the Fibreboard case.

The conflict in the circuits, however, does make a Supreme Court
ruling more likely. Until then, employers who decide to subcontract
without consulting the union must do so at their peril.

Plant shutdown or liquidation, of course, also affects employment. As might be expected, application of the rationale summarized

above resulted in a Board finding of an obligation to bargain in
advance of a decision to liquidate a clothing manufacturing business
in its entirety in the Star Baby case. 16 The theory has been considered by the Board as applicable to the sale of five stores in a chain of
six food stores, 17 and Board trial examiners in recent cases have
applied it to the sale of two unprofitable plants for purely economic
reasons and to a plant shutdown for economic reasons without any
sale of the facility.'

Changing technology in an industry may require changes in
operations for an employer's survival. Where such changes affect
employment, however, as in the case of a managerial decision to
15Id. at 562.
16

Star Baby Co., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 67 (1963).

Some doubt has been raised about

the validity of this aspect of the doctrine by the recent decision of the Fourth Circuit
in Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 4 CCH LAB. L. REP.
18585 (4th Cir. 1963). That
case held that the employer has an absolute right to cease business operations, in whole
or in part, for any reason, including anti-union bias. Although that case arose under
§ 8 (a) (3) and involved discriminatory motivation, it would seem that a nondiscriminatory situation involving only § 8 (a) (5) would present an a fortiori case.
"Weingarten Food Center, Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 25 (1962). No unlawful refusal
to bargain concerning the decision to discontinue operations was found because the
NLRB General Counsel had failed to argue this violation; the decision, however, made
it plain that but for this technicality, the doctrine would have been applicable to this
situation.
18 Mitchell Boat Co., BNA 1963 DAILY LAB REP. No. 156, at A-7 (case No. 13-CA5484); United Dairy Co., BNA 1963 DAILY LAB REP. No. 107, at D-1 (case No. 6-CA2551). The trial examiner in the United Dairy case stated that "sales, or mergers, or
other dispositions of facilities in our rapidly changing economy have such an obvious,
direct and devastating impact on the jobs of employees that they fall within the
principle relied upon by the Board in subcontracting cases." Among other things,
he ordered the employer to furnish the union a copy of the sales agreement. In the
Mitchell Boat case, the plant shutdown occurred three days after a union request for
recognition, but it was found to be for valid economic reasons. The trial examiner,
however, held the union should have been consulted concerning the layoff decision.
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purchase materials from others which were previously fabricated
internally, the duty to bargain in advance of the decision still exists
under the Board's present theory. Thus, in the Renton News case,19
the Board found that a refusal to bargain with the union concerning
the intended change violated section 8 (a) (5), notwithstanding clear
evidence that the change was essential for the employer to remain
competitive in the light of technological improvements in the industry. The following observations by the Board in connection with
the remedy indicate the lack of significance attached to the degree of
economic necessity for the unilateral action:
The change in the method of operations in this case is the result of
technological improvements. Obviously, such improvements serve the
interest of the economy as a whole and contribute to the wealth of the
Nation. Nevertheless, the impact of automation on a special category of
employees is a matter of grave concern to them. It may involve not only
their present but their future employment in the skills for which they
have been trained. Accordingly, the effect of automation on employment
is a joint responsibility of employers and the representatives of the employees involved 2 0
Radical changes in traditional functions of management would
result if the Board's simple rationale were carried to its logical conclusion in many situations to which it could apply. Such situations
could involve not only subcontracting, plant shutdown, plant sale,
going out of business, and purchasing rather than making components, but also the transfer of work to a different plant of the same
employer, the elimination of an unprofitable product line with
resulting job elimination, a corporate merger involving consolidation of operations, the general scheduling of production, and the
introduction of laborsaving equipment, materials, or methods.
Almost any decision about production has an effect on employment; conceivably even decisions about marketing and finance could
be found to have such an effect. The NLRB General Counsel
has already stated that the obligation to bargain may extend to
decisions involving transfer of work to a different plant or a parallel
operation of the same employer. 21 He has even suggested that
29 Renton News Record, 136 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1962).
20 Id.

at 1297.

21 Address by Stuart Rothman, then NLRB General Counsel, February 15, 1963,
before the Wisconsin Bar Ass'n Labor Law Section, BNA 1963 DAILY LAB. REP. No. 33,
at D-1. The present General Counsel, Arnold Ordman, was the trial examiner in
Adams Dairy, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 815 (1962), modified, 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963).
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a decision about operations which would reduce overtime work must
be bargained about in advance, stating, "If it is work which can fairly
be said to be 'unit work,' unilateral employer action and decision
without bargaining discussions may be unprivileged." 22
The Board itself has, of course, attempted to minimize the practical significance of its Town & Country doctrine. It has pointed out
that the duty to bargain about a decision to subcontract should not
involve any undue burden on the employer nor obligate him to yield
to the union. The Board has also expressed the view that "candid
discussion of mutual problems by labor and management frequently
results in their resolution with attendant benefit to both sides." 28
Notwithstanding these disclaimers, the Town & Country doctrine is
likely to have an impact not only on the procedure but also on the
effectiveness of managerial decision making concerning changes in
operations.
This impact results, first, simply from the fact that these cases
establish for the first time the rule that managerial decisions about
changes in operations which affect employment, made purely for
economic reasons, cannot be made unilaterally. The union must be
notified in advance of the decision, and the employer must bargain
with the union about the decision. This rule is not so clearly in
accord with prior Board and court decisions as the Board's recent
opinions would indicate, for the weight of prior Board and court
authority was to the effect that the duty to bargain was confined to
24
the effects of such a decision after it had been reached.
His intermediate report there would indicate that he would be no less zealous in

application of the doctrine. See also note 56 infra.
22 Id. at D-7.

3
" Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1027 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d
846 24(5th Cir. 1963).
See, e.g., NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1961), holding

that "the decision to move was not a required subject of collective bargaining, as it
was clearly within the realm of managerial discretion"; Jays Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 292
F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1961), citing first Fibreboarddecision of the Board with approval;

Phillips v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 199 F. Supp. 589 (N.D. Ga. 1961), denying injunction
to restrain employer from liquidating plant for economic reasons pending bargaining
with union; Krantz Wire 8: Mfg. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 971, other holdings enforced, 199 F.2d

800 (7th Cir. 1952), involving plant shutdown for legitimate business reasons held not
to require consultation with the union; Celanese Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951), involving subcontracting of maintenance work; Walter Holme & Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1169 (1949),
involving conversion of drivers to independent contractors; Mahoning Mining Co.,
61 N.L.R.B. 792, 803 (1945), stating that "the Board has never held that . . . an em-

change his business structure, sell or contract out a
ployer may not in good faith ....
portion of his operations, or make any like change which might affect the constituency
of the appropriate unit without first consulting the bargaining representative of the
employees affected ..

"; Brown-McLaren Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 984 (1941), holding
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The difference lies in the much greater degree of practical restriction on management's freedom to maneuver. The requirement of
advance notification to and discussion with the union inevitably
slows action, and delay itself may block the change. The possibility
that confidential plans, like those for a plant relocation, may become
public information may make the contemplated action impractical.
More important, such advance discussion effectively opens the possibility to the union of blocking, delaying, or modifying the contemplated action by threat or use of economic pressure. This introduces a new factor into the managerial decision. Estimates of cost
savings from a contemplated change in operations must now take
into account possible losses and uncertainties due to such economic
pressure. Concessions and compromises may be made which would
not otherwise be made. From the immediate viewpoint of the
affected employees and the union, of course, such ability to forestall
action is exactly the effect desired, but it must be recognized that it
restricts the ability of the individual enterprise to achieve optimum
operating results and the ability of the economy as a whole to adjust
to changing conditions.
A second reason for the impact of these cases is that the Board's
remedy for failure to fulfill the duty to bargain on such managerial
decisions is far more drastic than that invoked previously in purely
section 8 (a) (5) cases. The Board's order in the second Fibreboard
decision, compelling the employer to reinstitute the maintenance
operations and to reinstate the employees involved with back pay to
the date of the Board's decision, has been referred to as restoration of
the status quo ante. The Board maintains that this approach is necessary to adapt the remedy to the situation and that the more customary order to cease and desist from refusing to bargain while allowing
the employer's decision on subcontracting to stand would involve "an
exercise in futility." Following this general theory, the Board in the
Star Baby case, 25 which involved a complete shutdown and dissoluthat refusal to negotiate concerning transfer or removal of operations from one plant

to another did not constitute a refusal to bargain.

The following cases arise under

§ 8 (a) (3): NLRB v. Lassing, 284 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. R. C. Mahon Co.,
269 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1959); NLRB v. Adkins Transfer Co., 226 F.2d 324 (6th Cir.
1955); NLRB v. New Madrid Mfg. Co., 215 F.2d 908, 914 (8th Cir. 1954), involving a
shutdown and sale of a plant in which the court stated that an employer has "the
for whatabsolute right, at all times, to permanently close and go out of business ....
ever reason he may choose."; NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 211 F.2d 848 (5th
Cir. 1954).
2 Star Baby Co., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 67 (1963).
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tion of the business, while not ordering resumption of operations,
did order pay to the discharged employees until such time as they
obtained substantially equivalent employment elsewhere. Such back
pay awards are so costly that few employers can afford to take the
slightest risk in determining whether a decision to make a particular
change in operations must be bargained about in advance. One trial
examiner has candidly recommended that employers "avoid the peril
by resolving any doubts in favor of notifying and bargaining with
26
the union."
Thus, a union which is interested in fully exploiting the possibilities of the Board's new doctrine may be able to elevate its status
to that of a co-manager whose views and proposals must be solicited
and considered in connection with every decision which might affect
the employment relationship.
III
BASIs FOR THE BoARD's VIEw OF "CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT"

The Board's decisions in the Town & Country and Fibreboard
cases hinged on its determination that the employer's decision to
subcontract involved a matter within the meaning of "other terms
and conditions of employment," as that phrase is used in section 8 (d)
of the act, and was, therefore, a mandatory subject of bargaining.
This result was not altogether unexpected in view of the Board's
earlier decision in Shamrock Dairy,27 in which the conversion of
certain driver-employees to independent contractors for economic
reasons without advance notice to the union was found to be in violation of section 8 (a) (5). That case, however, involved unique facts
and had been distinguished in the first Fibreboarddecision. The
Board, consequently, had to strain for authority to support its broad
interpretation of a phrase which has been in the statute since 1947.
In the Town & Country case, the Board relied primarily on the
recent United States Supreme Court decision in Order of R.R.
Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. 2 8 While the latter case
involved an interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the
Railway Labor Act, rather than the provisions of the Labor-Management Relations Act involved in refusal to bargain cases, there were
"Shell

Oil Co., BNA 1963 DAILY LAz REP. No. 127, at A-8 (case No. 15-CA-2143).
Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 494 (1959).
28 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
27
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some similarities in the statutory language. The -Board, therefore,
concluded that the same principles must apply.
The basic issue in the Telegraphers case was whether the NorrisLaGuardia Act prohibited an injunction against the telegraphers'
union to restrain a strike against the Chicago &North Western Railway Company. The strike was threatened in connection with the
union's proposal of a prohibition on the elimination of any position
in existence on December 3, 1957, without union agreement. the
Court held that the district court had no jurisdiction permanently
to enjoin the strike because the case involved or grew out of a "labor
dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The
Court concluded that the union's proposal related to "conditions of
employment," as the term is used in that act, because the employment of many station agents represented by the union inescapably
depended upon the number of stations abandoned or consolidated.
The NLRB in its Town & Country decision apparently relied particularly on the Court's statement concerning the Railway Labor Act
that "the union's effort to negotiate its controversy with the railroad was in obedience to the Act's command that employees as well
as railroads exert every reasonable effort to settle all disputes 'concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions.' "29
Since under the Railway Labor Act the union's proposal was a
proper issue for bargaining, the strike would not have been unlawful
and enjoinable, the Court concluded, even in the absence of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. The NLRB in Town & Country therefore
apparently reasoned that since job abolition or discontinuance involve "working conditions" which must be bargained about under
the Railway Labor Act, abolition of jobs under a subcontracting
arrangement must also involve "conditions of employment" which
must be bargained about under the Labor-Management Relations
Act.
The Supreme Court in the Telegraphers case expressly rejected
the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that
the union's effort represented an attempt to usurp legitimate management prerogatives in the exercise of business judgment concerning
its operations.
20Id. at 339. It should be noted that the Court was not passing on the legality
of a refusal by the employer to negotiate, which was the issue involved in Town &
Country; rather, it was passing on the legality and enjoinability of a strike to enforce
the union's contract demand.
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In the second Fibreboarddecision, the Board also relied to some
extent on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Teamsters
0 which arose under Ohio antitrust laws and inUnion v. Oliver,8
volved an entirely different issue. The latter decision held that provisions of a collective bargaining agreement fixing minimum rentals
and other terms governing leases of motor vehicles involved subject
matter within the scope of "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" under section 8 (d) of the act, citing as an
example of the scope of this phrase an old Board decision in the case
of Timken Roller Bearing Co.,3 which had been reversed by the
Sixth Circuit and which had involved a subcontracting issue. In
the Timken case, the Board had found the employer's system of subcontracting to be a subject about which he must bargain as requested
by the union because it could vitally affect employees "by progressively undermining their tenure of employment."3 2 The Timken
case was also cited by the Board in the second Fibreboarddecision
with the note that the Board's decision in that case had been "reversed on other grounds." 33
It thus can be seen that there really was no clear judicial precedent for the Board's new doctrine. It is based primarily on interpretations of "conditions of employment" and "working conditions"
under the Norris-LaGuardia Act and Railway Labor Act, respectively, in the Telegrapherscase, plus an ambiguous citation of the Timken case in the Oliver decision. Moreover, it is in conflict with a
number of prior NLRB and court of appeals decisions. 84 This conflict is highlighted by the Eighth Circuit's recent Adams Dairy decision, in which a detailed analysis of the authorities resulted in reversal of the Board. By way of contrast, the decision of the Court of
Appeals upholding the Board in the Fibreboardcase (which is disposed of as "unpersuasive" in a footnote to the Adams Dairy decision) omits any citation of authority on the relevant legal questions.
It merely referred to the broad statutory language concerning bargaining and attributed to the Board the function of giving content
to the language.
S358 U.S. 283 (1959).

3"Timken

Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946), order set aside and enforce.
ment denied, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947).

'Id. at 518.
"The Board in that case also dted as precedent United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), discussed at note 62 infra.
" See cases cited note 24 supra.
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Commentary about conflict with precedent is not likely to change
the course of the Board's inclusive view of "other terms and conditions of employment," since the only authority the current Board
respects is the Supreme Court; and that body has not yet issued a
decision dealing directly with the extent of the duty of employers to
bargain collectively about changes in operations under the LaborManagement Relations Act. Yet it does appear that the Board has
overgeneralized from the Telegraphers case and existing rules concerning unilateral action and Board remedies. It seems doubtful,
moreover, that Congress, by its use of the general language in sections 8 (a) (5) and 8 (d), ever intended to eliminate completely the
exercise of managerial discretion on all decisions affecting employment.3 r It therefore seems likely that the Board's far-reaching general theory that "effect on employment" is synonymous with "conditions of employment," if not ultimately rejected by the remaining
courts which may be called upon to review it, will be considerably
refined or at least limited in determining the results which follow
from such an interpretation. Such refinement or limitation could
be based upon further analysis of (1) a distinction between a managerial decision to make a change in operations and the effectuation
of a change in terms and conditions of employment; (2) the actual
effect of unilateral changes in conditions of employment on bargaining relationships in various circumstances; (3) a distinction between the Town & Country situations and cases where a collective
1rSection 8 (d), as finally enacted in the 1947 amendments, was basically the Senate

version of the bargaining obligation. 1 LEGISrATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABol-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 242-44 (1948).
The House bill contained a lengthy

definition of the term "bargain collectively" which, among other things, would have
restricted the subject matter of bargaining to five specific categories. Id. at 162-67.
The House report by the Committee on Education and Labor stated with respect to
the original bill that "the union has no right to bargain with the employer about ...
how he shall manage his business .... ." Id. at 313-14. The Senate report by the
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare made no comment on the scope of the bargaining obligation in connection with § 8 (d), and the House conference report made
no comment concerning the omission of the restriction on the scope of bargaining. Id.
at 430, 539. None of the reports or discussions on the floor of Congress would indicate
that a requirement of advance bargaining concerning changes in operations or a
general prohibition on unilateral action was contemplated by the adoption of § 8(d).
In general, this provision was considered to be a provision benefiting employers, and
it was opposed by congressmen and senators favoring the union position. In adopting
§ 8(5) of the original National Labor Relations Act, the emphasis by Congress was
simply on compelling recognition of the bargaining agent, bringing the parties together, and having them make a reasonable effort to reach agreement. See Latham,
Legislative Purpose and Administrative Policy Under the National Labor Relations Act,
4 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 433, 463-64 (1936); Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty to Bargain" Concept in American Law, 39 MicH. L. REv. 1065, 1084-89 (1941).
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bargaining agreement is in effect; and (4) the propriety of the remedy. Consideration of each of these aspects of the doctrine may provide some guide to its future direction.
IV
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE DECISION AND THE EFFECTUATION
OF A CHANGE IN CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT

One of the novel aspects of the Town & Country doctrine alluded
to earlier is the requirement of consultation and bargaining with
the union as an integral part of the decision making process of
management. Such a requirement equates, for purposes of determining the bargaining obligation, the process of arriving at an
unexecuted decision to change with the effectuation of the change,
treating both as "conditions of employment." This, however, overlooks a significant distinction in determining the point at which the
required consultation and bargaining should take place and the
extent of the bargaining required.
Actually, a managerial decision may never be effectuated. Unforeseen circumstances may make the decision unnecessary or impractical. A given decision to make a change in operations may
affect employment in some circumstances but not in others. For
example, a decision to subcontract may apply only to orders beyond
current capacity. Thus, it is not the making of such a decision
which affects employment but its effectuation. Therefore, the decision itself is not a "condition of employment."
If such a distinction were recognized by the courts, it would provide a basis for limiting the required subject matter of bargaining to
the actual effect on employment-that is, how the implementation of
the decision may affect employees, rather than whether a managerial
decision shall be made about operations which happens to be accompanied by some incidental effect on employment. It is important to
bear in mind that such managerial decisions are not made for the
purpose of bringing about a change in conditions of employment,
and that effectuation of a given decision about operations may affect
employment in a variety of alternative ways. In order to provide an
adequate opportunity for bargaining about this effect on employment, however, some notice to the union in advance of effectuating
the decision probably should be required where the circumstances
make such notice practical.
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This requirement of bargaining concerning only the effects of
the decision upon employees is essentially the approach followed by
the Eighth Circuit in the recent Adams Dairy case, in which reliance
was placed on the Rapid Bindery case.3 6 In the latter case, the Second
Circuit stated that a decision to move a plant for economic reasons
was clearly within the realm of management discretion, but that such
action also required notice to the union before effectuating the decision so that the treatment of affected employees could be considered
by the negotiators. Both the Adams Dairy and Rapid Bindery decisions recognize the propriety of formulating management decisions
unilaterally on certain matters indirectly affecting conditions of employment; the Board does not.
The distinction suggested above, of course, would be disputed by
union representatives, many of whom have found the Town & Country doctrine a useful tool indeed. They undoubtedly would take the
position that bargaining about effect on employment cannot be
carried on in good faith if one alternative, namely the reversal of the
managerial decision, is foreclosed from bargaining. They would
argue that management should not be permitted to hand the union
a fait accompli in the form of a decision which has been already
37
made.
It should be noted, however, that the statutory bargaining obligation merely requires the employer to "confer in good faith with
respect to ...conditions of employment." 38 If the employer in bar-

31NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961). Failure to give any
notice of plant removal was held to be a violation of § 8 (a) (5) in Lori-Ann, Inc., 137
N.L.R.B. 1099 (1962); the Board there relied on Brown Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co., 106
N.L.R.B. 999, 1000 (1953), in which it had been held that good faith discharge of the
bargaining obligation required the employer at least to "advise the Union of the
contemplated move [of operations to another plant] and to give the Union the opportunity to bargain with respect to the contemplated move as it affected the employees
...." To the same effect was Brown-Dunkin Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 1379 (1959), enforced,
287 F.2d 17 (10th Cir. 1961), in which notice of a decision to subcontract the work of
the bargaining unit was not given to the union until the effective date of the contract.
There was a finding that the decision was discriminatorily motivated, for the employer
refused to bargain about the incidents of termination. However, no refusal to bargain
was found in NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 313 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1962), where several months
advance notice was given to the union of a decision to switch driver-salesmen to a
franchise system.
'1 If notice were given to the union before preparations for the change had reached
the "point of no return," however, even this argument would be unavailable, since
bargaining could then clearly concern not only what the effect would be but also
whether there would be any effect. Bargaining at this stage should satisfy even the
Board.
861 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958).
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gaining before effectuating the decision demonstrates a willingness
to explain the economic basis for its decision and to consider proposals for ameliorating the effects, that should be sufficient to indicate a mind which is not arbitrarily closed but which is merely
exercising good faith business judgment not inconsistent with the
statutory bargaining obligation. 39 Certainly the requirement of
conferring about conditions of employment would be met where
both advance notice is given and discussions take place concerning
the question of whether the employer will continue to provide employees with work, either on other jobs or at a new location, and
whether severance allowances or other benefits will be provided. A
finding of good faith should not be precluded merely because the
managerial decision concerning operations already has been arrived
at unilaterally. As a practical matter, the major managerial decisions
on subcontracting or plant relocation, about which unions are primarily concerned, involve so many serious direct and indirect consequences that they are normally arrived at only when the economic circumstances are so compelling that there is no real, satisfactory alternative. Where the decision in question is not directly concerned with
conditions of employment but is made on the basis of demonstrated
economic necessity, good faith would seem to be indicated, unless
there are some special circumstances under which the unilateral
decision in itself could be said to be evidence of bad faith. To
determine whether this is the case, analysis of the general theories
surrounding unilateral action is necessary.
V
RESTRICTIONS ON UNILATERAL ACTION

The Board's readiness to broaden the concept of what constitutes
"conditions of employment," concerning which a duty to bargain
exists, is particularly significant in the light of its premise that no
change in such conditions can be made unilaterally. The Board
has in effect adopted the theory that regardless of the circumstances,
motivation, or effect, unilateral action with respect to conditions of
employment constitutes per se a refusal to bargain in violation of
section 8 (a) (5).
A similar point has been made by former NLRB Chairman Guy Farmer based
prfmarily on a concept of good faith and practical considerations rather than a distinction between managerial decision making and effectuation. See Farmer, Good
Faith Bargaining Over Subcontracting, 51 GEo. L.J. 558 (1963), discussed at note 53
infra.
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This doctrine goes considerably beyond the court decisions on
which it is based. It is, of course, true that there are Board and court
decisions holding that in a variety of situations unilateral action by
an employer concerning conditions of employment does constitute a
refusal to bargain in violation of section 8 (a) (5). Analysis of the
decisions involving refusal to bargain based on unilateral action,
however, leads to the conclusion that the type of action and the
circumstances under which it is taken may make a difference. 40
The general theory underlying those cases was explained by the
Supreme Court in the May Dep't Stores case. 41 The Court there
stated that unilateral action to bring about changes in -wage scales
was tantamount to bargaining with individuals or minorities and
"minimizes the influence of organized bargaining. It [also] interferes with the right of self-organization by emphasizing to employees
'
It is
that there is no necessity for a collective bargaining agent."4
noteworthy that in this case the action was taken shortly after the
certification of the bargaining agent and as part of a continuing refusal of the employer to deal with the union at all because the employer challenged the propriety of the unit.
In the recent Katz case,43 in which the Supreme Court found a
refusal to bargain on certain unilateral changes in wages and sick
leave, notwithstanding the absence of independent bad faith in
negotiations, the Court intimated that unilateral action might not be
violative of section 8 (a) (5) under all circumstances, stating:
But the Board is authorized to order the cessation of behavior which is
in effect a refusal to negotiate, or which directly obstructs or inhibits the
actual process of discussion, or which reflects a cast of mind against
reaching agreement. Unilateral action by an employer without prior
discussion with the union does amount to a refusal to negotiate about the
affected conditions of employment under negotiation, and must of necessity obstruct bargaining, contrary to the congressional policy.. It will
often disclose an unwillingness to agree with the union. It will rarely be
justified by any reason of substance. It follows that the Board may hold
40For an exhaustive analysis of the decisions on unilateral action prior to 1955, see

Bowman, An Employer's UnilateralAction-An Unfair Labor Practice?, 9 VAND. L.REv.
487 (1956). The author suggests that unilateral action should not be unlawful per se.
See also Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HIv.L. REv. 1401 (1958).
"2May Dep't Stores v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 576 (1945).
12Id. at 385. An early Board decision on unilateral action emphasized the blow to
union prestige from unilateral action regarding wages during negotiations or shortly
after a demand for recognition. Riverside Mfg. Co., 20 N.L.R.B. 394, 407 (1940),
modified, 119 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1941).
10 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
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such unilateral action to be an unfair labor practice in violation of
§ 8 (a) (5), without also finding the employer guilty of over-all subjective
bad faith. While we do not foreclose the possibility that there might be
circumstances which the Board could or should accept as excusing or

justifying unilateral action, no such case is presented here. (Emphasis
added.) 4
In that case, the subject matter of the unilateral action was also
a primary subject of pending negotiations, namely wages and sick
leave. The Court's holding was expressly related to "unilateral
change in conditions of employment under negotiation."45 It is
difficult to argue with the Court's conclusion that unilateral action
on employee wages during wage negotiations frustrates bargaining
in most cases.
Even where the action does involve the subject of current negotiations, there is one well-established situation in which unilateral
employer action is permitted. That is the situation where an impasse in negotiations has been reached. The basis for the impasse
doctrine, as explained by the Supreme Court, is that a unilateral
grant of an increase in pay after the same proposal has been left
unaccepted or rejected in negotiations might well carry no disparagement of the collective bargaining proceedings. 46 Thus, we again
have recognition by the Supreme Court that it is not the unilateral
action itself which is an evil, but it is the effect of such action on the
bargaining process.
A test of the duty to bargain about changes, based on the likelihood of disparaging or undermining the union, was applied in the
Bradley Washfountain case,47 where no refusal to bargain was found
in the unilateral institution of wage increases and holiday benefits
which the union had rejected, even in the absence of an impasse
having been reached. In finding it "impossible to construe the facts
as disparaging or undermining the union," 48 the Court gave consideration to the long, historically amicable relationship existing between the company and the union and pointed to statements of the
trial examiner to the effect that the unilateral action may even have
enhanced the union's prestige. While there was evidence of advance
" Id. at 747-48.

1 Id. at 743. (Emphasis added.)
,6 NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 337 U.S. 217 (1949).
4 NLRB v. Bradley Washfountain Co., 192 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1951). See also W.W.
Cross & Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1162 (1948).
48 NLRB v. Bradley Washfountain Co., supra note 47, at 151.
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notice to and consultation with the union which affected the outcome of that case, its significance here is the emphasis on lack of
actual union disparagement.
The Supreme Court in the American Insurance case 49 also gave
implied recognition to the principle that unilateral action does not
necessarily result in disparagement of the union. There the Court
ruled that it was not a refusal to bargain for an employer to insist
upon a management functions clause as a condition precedent to
signing any contract. The Court rejected the Board's theory that
insistence on a clause which would give management initial responsibility for work scheduling and other matters was in derogation of
the employees' statutory bargaining rights, even though at least
some of the matters covered by such a clause were "conditions of
employment" under section 8 (d) of the act. In fact, the Court
seemed to reject the whole theory of per se violation of section
8 (a) (5), stating that "the duty to bargain collectively is to be enforced by application of the good faith bargaining standards of section 8 (d) to the facts of each case."5 Similarly, in NLRB v. LewinMathes Co., 51 the court held that it was not bad faith bargaining
for an employer to insist on a clause giving management the right to
make work assignments unilaterally. Since an employer may in
bargaining insist on a clause giving it the exclusive control over
certain conditions of employment, thereby removing such subjects
from bargaining, without it being considered unlawfully disparaging
to the union, a practice of taking unilateral action without such a
contract provision should, by the same token, not in itself be disparaging in every case. It all depends on the circumstances.
The motivation and effect of an employer's action were considered to be crucial factors by the court in approving the subcontracting in the Adams Dairy case. Since that case lacked evidence of any
unlawful specific intent, the court stated that the remaining test was
"whether the very decision itself had, as its natural consequence, a
discouragement of union membership and constituted an encroachment upon the vested rights of the employees." 52 Finding no such
consequence, the court found no violation of section 8 (a) (5). While
the court emphasized the necessity for a discouragement of union
40 NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
40 rd. at 409.
5-285 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1960).
2 NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 322 F.2d 553, 557 (8th Cir. 1963).
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membership rather than a disparagement of the bargaining process,
the basic approach is the same as suggested here, namely that of
relying on the effect of management action.
Thus, it appears that since the May Dep't Stores case, the courts
have followed the reasoning that even when a particular change falls
within the scope of "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment," the finding of a refusal to bargain does not follow
automatically from the unilateral change. Rather, the possible effect
on the bargaining relationship must be examined in each case.
Assuming, for example, that a particular change in operations
falls within "conditions of employment," unlawful frustration of
bargaining might normally be expected to follow from unilateral
institution of such change in the midst of actual contract negotiations with respect to it. Even in such a case, however, examination
of the circumstances would be in order to determine whether this
is a reasonably probable effect. Certain changes made in the ordinary
course of managing a business could be so minor and so obviously
practical that bargaining discussions could continue without an adverse effect, even though in a technical sense a change in "conditions
of employment" might have been made. In other circumstances,
however, the action might render further discussions useless and
therefore be tantamount to a refusal to confer in good faith as
expressly required by the act. 53
A dearer case of no disparagement would be presented where
bargaining is in progress, but the change does not involve a matter
under discussion or about which bargaining has been requested-for
example, scheduling a layoff due to lack of work during general contract negotiations. The change obviously affects employment and
would therefore come within the broadened scope of "conditions of
employment." Yet the change, if made in good faith for economic
reasons, should not have a tendency to discourage or frustrate bar58 Farmer, supra note 59, at 569-71 takes the position, with respect to managerial
decisions on subcontracting, that the Board should apply a "rule of reason" in circumstances where there is no agreement in effect and negotiations are in progress.
Thus, an employer should be left free to conduct his business without the necessity
for bargaining so long as he is motivated by business necessity and does not take action
of a permanent character which has the effect of removing the subject matter from
the bargaining table or foreclosing negotiation of an agreement on the matter. He
also suggests that where business necessity requires permanent elimination of all or
part of a bargaining unit, notice to the union of the plan may be required along with
an explanation of the relevant economic considerations. Negotiation in good faith
concerning terminal pay and benefits, of course, would also be required.
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gaining, particularly if the parties have had a fairly long prior bargaining history and a practice of such unilateral change. The mere
fact that employment is lost should not in itself damage the standing
of the union in the eyes of employees because loss of employment for
economic reasons is an inherent hazard. Nevertheless, a refusal to
bargain would presumably be found under the current philosophy
of the Board that "any unilateral change in wages, terms or conditions of employment, which the employer makes while bargaining
negotiations are in progress, is itself a wrongful refusal to bargain
4 While the authority cited by the Board for this proposition
....
is the Katz case, it goes beyond the Supreme Court's statement in that
case which was limited to conditions of employment under negotiation.
This statement of the Board, however, would still leave room
for a finding of no unlawful disparagement if a change were made
when there is no bargaining in process on this subject or any other
subject. That would seem to be the clearest situation of all in which
unilateral action might be permitted, particularly if the subject
matter of the change has not normally been a subject for bargaining
in the past. Such an approach would eliminate the necessity for the
ritual of an employer initiating bargaining about a subject on which
he does not need union agreement. It should be noted that such a
situation is quite different from the one involved in the Telegraphers
case on which the Board relies so heavily, in which the employer
was refusing to bargain about a specific proposal initiated by the
union.
Certainly, some unilateral action is not only not harmful to
union status but is essential to effective managerial decision making.
Unless the courts are now willing to adopt the Board's per se
theory of unilateral action, they will have to consider the effect of
such action on the bargaining relationship under the facts in each
case. In so doing, it would seem they should distinguish between a
situation where the particular "condition of employment" is a pending subject of bargaining discussions and one where it is not. In
this connection, the existence of a current collective bargaining
agreement also deserves special attention. 55
51 Hawaii Meat Co., 139 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (1962), enforcement denied, 321 F.2d 397
(9th Cir. 1963).

51 Farmer argues with respect to subcontracting that where there is a collective
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VI
EFFECT OF A CURRENT COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

None of the recent cases involving unilateral changes in operations have adequately considered the effect of a current collective
bargaining agreement.5 6 The question of this effect may be presented in any one of four possible situations: (1) where the change
in operations is expressly permitted or prohibited by the agreement; (2) where the change is permitted or prohibited by some
reasonable implication from some general provision of the agreement; (3) where the agreement is completely silent on the subject
of such change, but there is an express or implied waiver of bargaining about it; or (4) where the agreement is silent, and there is
no basis for a waiver of any kind.
If the agreement expressly permits or prohibits a particular
change in operations, that clearly eliminates the necessity for further
bargaining in view of the provision of section 8 (d) of the act that
the duty to bargain "shall not be construed as requiring either party
bargaining agreement with a general arbitration clause and without any express provision on subcontracting, the bargaining obligation should be limited to processing a
grievance through the arbitration process. Farmer, supra note 39, at 572.
56The effect of the contract as a possible waiver of bargaining was considered by
the trial examiner in Shell Oil Co., BNA 1963 DAILY LAn. REPr. No. 127, at A-8
(case No. 15-GA-2143), but no waiver was found. In the Adams Dairy case, which
involved a change from driver-salesmen to third-party independent distributors during
the term of an existing collective bargaining agreement, the Board decision did not
consider the effect of the agreement, but the intermediate report of trial examiner
Arnold Ordman (now NLRB General Counsel) did. He concluded that this action
by the employer amounted to a termination of the collective bargaining agreement, since
there was no area left in which it could be operative. Therefore, he found that the employer's failure to comply with the sixty day notice provisions of § 8 (d) of the act,
applicable to cases of termination of contracts, constituted a further basis for a violation of § 8 (a) (5). The flaw in this theory is the assumption that termination of
employees automatically terminates a collective bargaining agreement for a fixed term.
The possible effect of the notice provisions of § 8 (d) is still being urged by the General
Counsel in such cases, as indicated by the intermediate report of the trial examiner in
Hillcrest Dairy Co., BNA 1963 DMLY LAB. REP. No. 146, at D-1 (case No. 8-CA-2928),
where the General Counsel took the position that a change in the working conditions
of drivers could be viewed as a change in the terms of the agreement and that the
company had therefore modified the agreement unilaterally without complying with
the notice requirements of § 8(a). As the trial examiner pointed out, this argument
is tantamount to contending that any violation of a collective bargaining agreement
is necessarily an unfair labor practice, a theory which has not yet been sustained.
The Board had considered a similar contention in Shamrock Dairy Inc., 124 N.L.R.B.
494 (1959), but only two Board members supported it. However, in Smith's Van &
Transp. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 1059 (1960), a violation of § 8(d) was found on a similar
basis.
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to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms or conditions
contained in a contract for a fixed period ....

,,57

The more common situation is where there is no express provision covering the subject of a particular change in operations, but
there is a general management clause giving the employer broad
powers in areas not expressly restricted by other portions of the
agreement.
Some authority for the view that such a contract eliminates the
necessity to bargain can be found in the Court of Appeals decision
in the Timken Roller Bearing case. 58 The Board decision in that
case had held that a refusal to accede to the union's request for bargaining about the company's existing practice of subcontracting unilaterally constituted a violation of section 8 (a) (5). The Board had
relied on the general proposition that the obligation to bargain does
not end with the signing of a contract. The court held that in view
of the existing practice, this was really a dispute as to the interpretation of the management clause which should be settled through the
contractual grievance procedure. The court viewed the grievance
procedure as a channel for bargaining and concluded that there had
been no refusal to bargain.
This reasoning would seem to be even more valid in view of the
recent Warrior & Gulf decision of the Supreme Court,59 where it
was held that a grievance concerning subcontracting was subject to
the grievance procedure under a collective bargaining agreement,
notwithstanding a contract clause which excluded from arbitration
matters which were "strictly a function of management." This is
not to say that subcontracting is necessarily a contract violation
which the grievance procedure must always remedy, but merely that
during the term of a contract any bargaining obligation which might
otherwise exist should be supplanted by the applicable grievance
procedure and arbitration. Since there is clearly a contractual
remedy available, the union may properly be required to use it.
The Board itself at one time recognized the validity of such a
theory in McDonnell Aircraft Corp.60 The Board there espoused
61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1958).
" Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947). The court
reaffirmed this holding in a later case involving a different type of unilateral action.
NLRB v. Standard Oil Co., 196 F.2d 892, 894-95 (6th Cir. 1952).
50 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
00McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 109 N.L.R.B. 930 (1954). The Board generally has
5
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the principle maintained earlier in this article that "the vice in such
unilateral action is that it undermines the authority of the bargaining representative and indicates a lack of good faith in entering into
or pursuing bargaining negotiations."161 The Board then pointed out
that the usual situation in which unilateral action had been found
violative of the duty to bargain involved changes during active contract negotiations or while a majority union was seeking bargaining
rights, but it suggested that the existence of a contract created an
entirely different context. Consequently, the Board regarded a
unilateral change in assignment of certain clerical work to nonbargaining unit employees not as a disparagement of the collective
bargaining process, but rather as a dispute over the interpretation of
the agreement.
In the McDonnell case, the union was handicapped by the fact
that prior to the unfair labor practice charge a grievance had actually
been filed on this matter and processed through the third step. The
union thereby in effect conceded the applicability of the contract.
A more difficult case would be presented where the union has failed
to file a grievance and argues that bargaining is required because
there is no provision in the contract covering the change in operations in question.
If the contract contains almost any type of management clause,
however, the question for the Board would inevitably be a question
of contract interpretation like that presented in the Timken case,
namely whether the management clause permits the particular
change in operations. This is a question which, according to the
Supreme Court in the Warrior & Gulf case, arbitrators are ideally
suited to decide. Therefore, if management's refusal to bargain is
based on a good faith claim that the matter is properly the subject
of a grievance and a willingness to follow that procedure is demonstrated by management, that claim should be respected by the Board,
followed the rule announced in Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694, 706
(1943), order amended and enforced, 141 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1944), that "it will not
effectuate the statutory policy... for the Board to assume the role of policing collective
contracts between employers and labor organizations by attempting to decide whether
disputes as to the meaning and administration of such contracts constitute unfair labor
practices under the Act." See also Ass'n of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 443 (1955); United Tel. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 779
(1955); Crown Zellerbach Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 753 (1951). The only exception to thig
rule is in the case of a charge of discrimination under § 8 (a) (3).
61McDonnell Aircraft Corp., supra note 60, at 934.
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as it was in a slightly different refusal to bargain context in Hercules

6
Motor Corp.

2

If the matter were taken to arbitration and the arbitrator decided
that the contract permitted the change in operations, then it would
be clear not only that the change was not a contract violation, but
also that bargaining outside the grievance procedure would not have
been required under existing Board rules because this was one of the
terms of an existing collective bargaining agreement which under
section 8 (d) is not subject to bargaining for the duration of the
agreement. If, on the other hand, the arbitrator found that the
contract prohibited the change, this would still indicate that the
matter was covered by the contract and, therefore, no bargaining
was necessary. The arbitrator's award in such a case might properly
require reinstatement with back pay to any employees who lost work,
in order that the injured employees could be made whole for the
contract violation. The grievance route would thus effectively
resolve such a matter and place the question of contract interpretation where it normally belongs by the terms of the contract itself,
namely with an arbitrator rather than with the Board.
62 Hercules Motor Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 1648 (1962), in which the employer denied
the union's request for data concerning incentives and access of an observer to the
plant on the ground that the grievance procedure limited its obligation. The Fifth
Circuit in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 806 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1962), also recognized the
effect of the Warrior & Gulf decision in this regard by holding that an employer was
not guilty of a refusal to bargain in withholding certain information from the union
which, under its interpretation of the management clause of the contract, he was not
required to furnish; the court held that the question of interpretation of the management clause must be resolved in arbitration. Thus the court was in effect saying that
where the question of an unfair labor practice hinges on a matter of contract interpretation, the contract interpretation must first be resolved in the grievance procedure. In
reliance on the Warrior & Gulf case, the court stated: "Ironically enforcement here
of the Board's order to produce data for use in the prosecution of the pending grievance will be to make the grievance proceeding largely superfluous. For enforcement
will be a judicial declaration that the Union's, not the Employer's, interpretation of
the contract is the correct one. But just as a Court, under the guise of determining
arbitrability, may not determine the merits, neither may the Board adjudicate the
grievance dispute under the guise of determining relevance and pertinency of the data
sought. Because the order under review clashes with the policy of effectual achievement
of contractual arbitration, it may not be enforced." Id. at 570-71. In this connection,

see Cox, The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Term of An Existing Agreement,

63 HARV. L. Rav. 1097, 1107 (1950): "Consequently it may fairly be anticipated that
when the issue is squarely presented, the NLRB and courts will hold that the duty to
bargain collectively, while a contract is in force, is satisfied by offering to handle under
the contract procedures any issues to which they apply." Regarding a question of
arbitrability, Cox's position was consistent with the Sinclair case: "The NLRB should
not attempt to resolve a controversy over the arbitrability of a dispute unless the party
asserting the applicability of the contract procedure is acting in bad faith." Cox, supra
at 1108.
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If it is conceded by both parties that the change would not be a
proper subject for a grievance because it is completely outside the
contract, the mere existence of the contract in itself would not under
present Board and court doctrines preclude bargaining. The Jacobs
Mfg. Co. case has established the rule that matters not covered by
the contract and not discussed during negotiations are mandatorily
bargainable during the contract term. 3 The court in that case held
that the provisions of section 8 (d) eliminating the obligation to bargain about modifications of the terms and conditions contained in
a contract did not apply in such a situation, although it expressly
reserved judgment on the situation where the matter had been discussed in contract negotiations. The Board, however, would also
find a bargaining obligation in the latter situation unless it could be
shown that the subject was fully discussed or consciously explored in
prior negotiations and the union had consciously yielded or clearly
and unmistakably waived its interest in the matter. 04 This obviously
is a hard test to meet. Just how hard is indicated by the intermediate report of the trial examiner in the recent Shell Oil case
involving the subcontracting of miscellaneous maintenance work.06
A union proposal to restrict subcontracting had been the chief matter in negotiations leading up to the contract in effect at the time
of the work in dispute, but that contract merely continued a previously existing clause to the effect that in the event the company let
construction work to an outside contractor, the outsider would have
to pay his employees not less than the rates for the same work under
the collective bargaining agreement in effect for Shell employees.
Nevertheless, the trial examiner held that the inclusion of this
provision and the previous discussions concerning the union's proposed restrictions did not amount to a clear and unmistakable waiver
of bargaining about subcontracting.
If this reasoning is upheld by the Board and the courts, it would
appear that little short of a sweeping express waiver of bargaining
of the type included in the contract between General Motors and
the UAW is likely to suffice.60 That clause refers to a waiver of bar"' NLR.B v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952).
64

Proctor Mfg. Corp., 131 N.L.R.B. 1166 (1961); Press Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 976 (1958).

05Shell Oil Co., BNA 1963 DAILY LAB. REP. No. 127, at A-8 (case No. 15-CA-2143).

"Agreement between General Motors Corp. and UAW-AFL-CIO, Sept. 20, 1961,
BNA CoLLErTrvE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS & CoNTRACts 20: 303, 346-47. The clause
provides: "The parties acknowledge that during the negotiations which resulted in this
Agreement, each had the unlimited right and opportunity to make demands and
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gaining on all subjects covered and not covered by the contract, even
though unknown at the time of negotiations, and it should be sufficient to relieve the employer of an obligation to bargain on changes
in operations during the contract term. Certainly such a clause
would meet the requirement that a waiver of bargaining must be
clear and unequivocal.
While some situations are perhaps more clear than others, there
appears to be a reasonable basis for concluding that unilateral action
on changes in operations should not be an unlawful refusal to bargain where there is a collective bargaining agreement in effect, except
possibly in the rare case where the contract contains no management
or waiver of bargaining clause.
VII
THE REMEDY

Probably the most disturbing aspect of the Board's new theory
to employers has been the status quo ante remedy invoked in the
Star Baby and Fibreboarddecisions. The Board has taken the position that this was necessary to adapt the remedy to the situation
which called for redress. The Board contends that without reinstatement or its equivalent an order to bargain in most cases would be
an exercise in futility.
Section 10 (c) of the act does give the Board broad powers not
only to issue orders to cease and desist from unfair labor practices,
but also "to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of
employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of
this Act." 67 The Supreme Court has recognized that this language

does give the Board wide latitude in shaping remedies. 68 The Court,
however, has also held that this broad language does not vest the
proposals with respect to any subject or matter not removed by law from the area
of collective bargaining, and that the understandings and agreements arrived at by

the parties after the exercise of that right and opportunity are set forth in this agreement. Therefore, the Corporation and the Union, for the life of this agreement, each
voluntarily and unqualifiedly waives the right, and each agrees that the other shall
not be obligated to bargain collectively with respect to any subject or matter referred
to, or covered in this agreement, or with respect to any subject or matter not specifically
referred to or covered in this Agreement, even though such subject or matter may
not have been within the knowledge or contemplation of either or both of the parties
at the time that they negotiated or signed this Agreement."

0 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (c) (1958).
NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953); Virginia Elec. & Power Co.
v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533 (1943).
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Board with unlimited discretion to devise punitive measures or prescribe penalties of the act. It has stated that "the power to command
affirmative action is remedial, not punitive."6 9
The implication is that reinstatement should be awarded only to
make employees whole. In order to make employees whole, a remedial order should place them in the position they would have been
in if the unfair labor practice had not taken place. In refusal to bargain situations of the type under discussion here, the wrong consists
solely in the failure to bargain. The terminations of employment, in
themselves, were not unlawful, because they could have taken place
exactly as they did even if no unfair labor practice had been committed. Since the recent Board orders have awarded employment or
back pay to employees which they might not have had, even if the
bargaining had taken place, the remedial principle seems to have
been violated. These orders seem to overlook the fact that possible
loss of employment is inherent in the situation regardless of the
extent of bargaining.70
Where rights of innocent third parties are involved in changes in
operations, the Board has thus far recognized the inequity of attempting to "unscramble the egg" and has stopped short of the status
quo ante remedy.7 1
While the Court of Appeals in the Fibreboard case deemed the
Board's remedy as appropriate on the basis of the general policy of
giving the Board wide latitude in shaping remedies, it would not be
surprising if other courts inhibited the use of this unusual remedy
on the grounds of its punitive effect, in recognition of a well
established limit on the Board's latitude.
VIII
CONCLUSION

The imposition of a legal obligation on employers to bargain
with unions concerning wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
69 Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 12 (1940); accord, Consolidated Edison
Co. v. NLI3, 305 U.S. 197, 285 (1938).
0 An interesting statutory point in connection with the remedy was argued in

petitioner's brief in the Fibreboardcase before the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia but not discussed in the court's opinion. It was argued that § 10 (c) of the
act prohibits the Board from ordering reinstatement of any individual "discharged
for cause" and that the discharges in this case were for cause. Brief for Petitioner,
pp. 45-47, Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
71 United Dairy Co., BNA 1963 DAILY LAB. REP. No. 107, at D-1 (case No. 6-CA2551); Renton News Record, 186 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1962).
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of employment has inevitably resulted in some restriction upon
management discretion to make changes in operations. The Board
and court decisions in refusal to bargain cases under section 8 (a) (5)
are only a partial record of the extent of this restriction, but they do
indicate a constantly widening scope of mandatory bargaining and
a narrowing scope for free exercise of managerial discretion.
In view of this trend, the shift of subcontracting and plant removal issues into the mandatory bargaining category is not in itself
startling. There are, however, three noteworthy aspects of the line
of cases under consideration here.
The first is the all-encompassing nature of the Board's test of the
type of managerial decisions constituting "conditions of employment" which must be bargained about in advance. Very few managerial decisions lack some effect on employment which a zealous
Board could find as the basis for bringing them within this view of
the statutory term.
A second is the Board's assumption that any unilateral action
with respect to such conditions of employment constitutes a refusal
to bargain, regardless of the likely effect on the bargaining relationship. The Board seems determined to ignore circumstances which
might justify failure to bargain in advance or render such failure
harmless.
The final aspect is the Board's status quo ante remedial concept,
with its prohibitive potential liability for misinterpreting the bargaining obligation without wrongful motivation. In cases of the
slightest doubt, bargaining is effectively compelled.
There can be little question that the practical effect of these
Board decisions will be to hamper the ability of management to carry
out its primary function of maximizing long run profits. The wellpublicized profit squeeze in recent years has increased pressure on
management to improve operations. To do this, it needs flexibility
to innovate, to improvise, and to adjust to changing conditions. This
is precisely what the Board's new doctrine has taken away, to an extent not yet fully determined.
The widespread effect on employees of attempts by management
to improve operations, of course, has also generated pressure on
unions to resist such changes. Maximization of profits is of little
concern to the man whose tenure of employment is in jeopardy.
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Collective bargaining is one way of reconciling these conflicting
pressures on management and unions. In fact, many unions through
collective bargaining have already won contractual restrictions on
management's discretion in the area of subcontracting and other
changes in operations. These restrictions, however, have been won
on the basis of the bargaining ability of the particular union without
the aid of novel Board doctrines.
What the Board has now done is to compel employers who have
no such contractual restrictions and who do not legally need union
consent to take action to nevertheless initiate bargaining with respect to almost any contemplated change. There is something artificial about a concept of bargaining with a party whose agreement is
not needed. As a practical matter, such initiation of bargaining
amounts to an invitation to restriction.
The injection by the Board of this step into management decision making has perhaps been influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by the Board's awareness of severe economic hardship to
employees resulting from plant relocations and technological changes
in the past few years. The Board seems to be under the impression
that if the parties will just sit down and bargain about these problems, a satisfactory solution will be found. In the Town & Country
case it announced the optimistic view that as a result of such bargaining "business operations may profitably continue and jobs may be
preserved." 72 Commendable as this social motivation may be, it must
be recognized that in attempting to ameliorate this problem by
forced bargaining, the Board is introducing new rigidity into a delicate economic mechanism.
Whether this will actually have an adverse effect on the functioning of the economy remains to be seen, but this will depend to some
72 Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1027 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d
146 (5th Cir. 1963). The Board at this point in the decision relied upon Cox, supra
note 40, at 1412. Actually, the portion of the Cox article referred to was merely
discussing the general benefit of debate. Later in the article, he questions whether
unilateral action should be unlawful per se, pointing out that the answer depends on

whether the act "seeks to compel joint participation by law or leaves the joint participation to evolve without additional legal sanctions after it has created opposing
concentrations of economic power."

Id. at 1424. In an earlier article, the same author

stated: "The type of product which a company chooses to make, its price policies, the
location of its plants, its choice of production processes and the assignment of workers
are matters of practical importance to its employees. Nevertheless, it is generally

agreed that management should have exclusive responsibility for such matters without
the intervention of the union." Cox, Regulation of Collective Bargaining,63 HARv. L.
REv. 389, 401 (1950).
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extent on the willingness of the Board and the courts to push the
implications of the new doctrine to their logical conclusion.
It is submitted that they should not do so. Instead of requiring
joint participation in management, the Board and the courts can
adequately safeguard the welfare of employees by requiring bargaining only about the effect of changes in operations on employees,
in accordance with numerous Board and court holdings. Unions
which consider such bargaining ineffective are free to bargain for
additional protection as part of regular contract negotiations.

